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Abstract
We analyze rst-price equilibrium bidding behavior of capacity-constrained rms in a
sequence of two procurement auctions. In the model, rms with a cost advantage in com-
pleting the project auctioned o¤ at the end of the sequence may enter the unfavored rst
auction hoping to lose it. Equilibrium bidding in both auctions deviates from the standard
Symmetric Independent Private Value auction model (SIPV) due to opportunity costs of
bidding created by possibly employed capacity.
For this sequential auction model with non-identical objects, we show that revenue equiv-
alence holds.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies rst-price equilibrium bidding behavior in a sequential procurement auc-
tion model with capacity-constrained rms. Usually procurers di¤er across regions, rms, and
institutions and set independently of each other di¤erent auction dates implying a sequence
of auctions. Often projects to be auctioned o¤ are similar and o¤ered for execution during
the same window of time. Although the sequential nature of procurement auctions is prevalent,
most theoretical studies implicitly abstract it away by focussing on a single procurement auction
in isolation (e.g. Holt (1980), Riordan and Sappington (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1987b),
Dasgupta and Spulber (1989), Rob (1986), Celentani and Ganuza (2002)).
In the few contributions to the sequential procurement auction theory, it is common to
assume that any bidding rm has unlimited capacity to execute all sequentially o¤ered projects,
see e.g. Luton and McAfee (1986).1 However, recent empirical studies on sequential procurement
auctions point to the relevance of capacity constraints. De Silva et al. (2002, 2003) nd that
bids are positively correlated with employed capacity. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000, 2003)
report that a rm which did not win a highway procurement contract earlier in a sequence
of auctions is twice as likely to enter a subsequent auction than a rm which already won
a (large) contract. This evidence suggests that rms are aware of their opportunity costs of
bidding created by employed capacity and might be choosy if facing an auction sequence of
non-identical procurement contracts.
De Silva et al. (2003) provide an asymmetric, static bidding model to explore di¤erences in
bidding patterns observed in road construction auctions. In their model, rmsdistributions of
completion costs di¤er from one another which is motivated by the idea that rms are either
incumbents or entrants implying that bidders with identical completion costs di¤er in bidding
behavior; particularly, entrants bid more aggressively than incumbents which is statistically
conrmed in their empirical analysis. In our paper, we provide an alternative explanation for
di¤ering bidding functions in a symmetric, sequential auction model stemming from di¤erences
in the option value that rms assign to subsequently auctioned procurement contracts. In this
spirit, our model may be viewed as a way to endogenize asymmetries and di¤erences in bidding
functions in static models through heterogenous opportunity costs.
We consider a sequence of procurement auctions in the rst-price sealed-bid design where
projects are stochastically equivalent and bidding rms are capacity-constrained. Since a poten-
tial bidding rm nds itself restricted to execution of a subset of sequentially o¤ered heterogenous
projects, it must decide which procurement auctions to enter entailing a selection of projects it
1Exceptions include Elmaghraby (2003) and Gale et al. (2000) where in the latter the cost function can be
chosen to e¤ectively allow for capacity constraints.
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wishes to possibly end up with. Our model is closely related to that of Gale and Hausch (1994)
that, however, utilizes second-price auctions which are rather uncommon in procurement.
For a procurement sequence of identical projects, the analysis of Weber (1983) suggests that
equilibrium expected payments of winning bidders coincide and, hence, any rm may want to
begin bidding at the start of the sequence. If, however, rms prefer to execute one project to
another due to di¤erent project completion costs, it is a priori not clear if a rm with more
favorable completion costs for projects to be auctioned later in the sequence submit bids for
projects auctioned earlier.
This paper studies this kind of entry decision and analyzes how rms rene their bidding
strategies with opportunity costs of early bid submission. Our main ndings are that the entry
decision depends on relative project completion cost levels and equilibrium bidding in both
auction stages deviates from the standard Symmetric Independent Private Value auction model
(SIPV) and its sequential formulation with homogenous goods and single-unit demand. Firms
with lower completion costs for the rst project auctioned o¤ always submit bids while rms
with lower completion costs for the project subsequently auctioned o¤ only participate if their
opportunity costs are not too large. Each rm entering the rst auction includes its option value
of the second project in its bid for the rst project. Moreover, we derive revenue and payo¤
equivalence for the sequential model with non-identical project contracts.
An experimental investigation of our sequential rst-price auction model, see Brosig and
Reiss (2007), nds that the bidding deviations from the standard SIPV model predicted by our
model are, indeed, observed in the laboratory. This nding emphasizes that opportunity costs
of early bid submissions are understood by bidders and form a crucial determinant of bidding
behavior.
The next section introduces our model and its symmetric equilibrium. In section 3, we derive
payo¤ and revenue equivalence. Section 4 investigates di¤erences between the static SIPV model
and the sequential model. In particular, we illustrate how the option value of subsequent contract
opportunities a¤ects bidding decisions of rms. Section 5 concludes.
3
2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral rms, each endowed with capacity to complete a single project.2 Two
projects, L and M , are sequentially auctioned o¤. Subcontracting is prohibitively costly.3 The
rmscost of completing any of the two projects are their private information and known to
them at the beginning of the dynamic auction game. In order to formalize the similarity of
both projects and the aspect that the ranking of completion costs is unknown4 to competitors,
we assume in the spirit of Gale and Hausch (1994) that projects are stochastically equivalent.
In particular, it is common knowledge that rm is costs of completion are jointly drawn from
f(li,mi) with domain [c; c]2 and stochastically equivalent in the sense of f(l,m) = f(m; l) for
every (l;m) 2 [c; c]2 implying E[Li] = E[Mi] where li and mi denote the cost realization of rm i
for projects L and M respectively: Although completion costs of a single rm may be correlated
across projects, pairs of completion costs of di¤erent rms are independently distributed. If cost
realizations of rm i are such that li < mi, this rm is said to have a cost advantage for project
L; the reversed inequality indicates a cost advantage for project M .
In each procurement auction, a participating rm may submit a sealed bid where the lowest
bid wins the project and the bidded amount is paid in exchange for completion of the project.5
However, bids cannot exceed maximum completion costs c which may be interpreted as the
procurers outside option. We assume that the auctioneer cannot set a price below maximum
completion costs c and that resale of projects is not feasible. If there happens to be a bidding
tie, auctioneers employ a fair chance mechanism to break it. The sequence of auctions begins
with the procurement auction of project L where the winner if any is publicly announced before
project M is auctioned o¤. Thus, with two rms, any rm knows if it faces competition in
auction M before it submits its bid.
Since both rms are ex ante symmetric, we restrict attention to the case of symmetric
2Although the restriction that rms are required to complete at most a single project seems severe, closer
observation reveals that this element is common in procurement auctions. Firstly, procurers may stipulate exclu-
sive project completion to avoid that its competitors running a similar project gain benets through a contractor
working for both procurers. Secondly, a rm may face capacity constraints if projects run simultaneously and re-
quire relatively large amounts of its resources. Finally, rms may voluntarily decide not to execute simultaneously
several risky projects to prevent changes in the risk distribution of their entrepreneurial activities.
3Empirical studies on procurement bidding (e.g. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2000, 2003) nd that the proba-
bility that a rm participates in an auction and that a participating rm wins the auction decreases in its backlog.
This points to the fact that rms regard subcontracting as costly and not always as a feasible option to weaken
their capacity constraints.
4Unlike the second-price procurement auction model in Elmaghraby (2003) where it is assumed that the second
project is always more costly than the rst one.
5Although the analysis of the second-price auction design is less demanding, we employ the rst-price design
since otherwise our models bidding predictions cannot explain real-life data.
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perfect Bayesian equilibria. We refer to the representative rm as rm 1. The strategy of the
representative rm is given by (bL1 ,b
M
1 ) where the bid for auction L is given by b
L
1 2 R [ fno
entryg and bM1 2 R is the rms bid in auction M . In addition to equilibrium bidding functions
for each auction stage, a rms strategy also includes a decision to submit a bid in the rst
auction or skip bidding for project L: Intuitively, there must be a region of cost types where
rms reject to bid in auction L since a rm with completion cost l = c cannot make any prot by
completing this project and, moreover, is - if it has won project L - excluded from participating in
auction M where its expected prots may be positive due to more favorable costs of completion
m < c. Obviously, these extreme cost pairs highlight that opportunity costs, which coincide with
expected prots from skipping auction L; exceed expected prots from bidding for project L. In
general, rm 1 participates in auction L if its expected prot from bidding exceeds opportunity
costs arising from possibly being excluded from bidding for project M; formally
E[L+M1 j(l1;m1)]  E[M1 jm1];
where E[L+M1 j(l1;m1)] denotes rm 1s expected prot if it bids in the procurement auction for
project L and - if unsuccessful - continues bidding in auction M and E[M1 jm1] is its expected
prot if it skips the rst auction and bids only for the subsequently auctioned projectM: Prots
are random since completion costs of any competitor are unknown and determine its bidding
behavior.
The rms decision to skip auction L depends on the relationship of its completion costs.
In order to formalize the entry decision we introduce the entry indi¤erence curve g1 : [c; c] !
[c; c] that assigns a level for the completion cost of project L to each cost level of project M
such that the rm is indi¤erent between taking part in auction L and skipping it. The entry
indi¤erence curve lcrit1 = g1(m1) is implicitly dened by the equality of expected prots from
entering auction L and corresponding opportunity cost:
E
h
L+M1 j
 
lcrit1 ;m1
i
= E

M1 jm1

: (1)
In subsection 2.2, we show that the entry indi¤erence curve dened here exists. Figure 2, p.
12, illustrates the qualitative properties of the entry indi¤erence curve in equilibrium. Since it
cannot be worthwhile for a rm to participate in auction L with l1 > lcrit1 but it must be if
l1 < l
crit
1 , the rms decision rule to participate in auction L is given by
"1(l1;m1) =
8<: Enter Auction L if l1  g1(m1)Skip Auction L if l1 > g1(m1)
Next we derive the equilibrium bidding functions for both procurement auctions since these
determine expected prots on which the entry indi¤erence curve g1(m1) depends. Since the
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equilibrium bidding functions depend on the equilibrium entry indi¤erence curve themselves,
we derive these for any entry indi¤erence curve g1(m1): The equilibrium indi¤erence curve is
denoted by g(m) and is identied given equilibrium bidding behavior. Thus equilibrium bidding
and the entry indi¤erence curve are simultaneously determined.
2.1 Equilibrium Bidding Functions
Both auctions employ the rst-price sealed-bid auction format where the lowest bid wins.6 Under
this auction design, the symmetric equilibrium strategy in a one-shot procurement auction is
well-known, e.g. Holt (1980) and Cohen and Loeb (1990), and summarized in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Cohen and Loeb (1990), Equilibrium bidding in a rst-price sealed-bid procurement
auction
Let project completion costs of two risk-neutral rms that bid for a single project contract be
private information and independently and identically distributed according to cdf H(c), c 2 [c; c]:
Then, the symmetric equilibrium bidding function is b(c) = c+
R c
c [1 H(x)] dx= [1 H(c)].
(for a proof see the refereesappendix)
For our sequential procurement auction game, we derive the equilibrium bidding function
for each of the two project auctions by application of this lemma to our specic context with
additional strategic interaction: In the rst auction stage every rm knows that a second auction
follows. In the second auction stage, each bidder receives information on the outcome of the
rst auction L.
Consider rst the auction for project L. Any of the two rms that enters the rst auction
anticipates that in case it does not win the rst auction, it will be the only bidder in the
subsequent auction M where it will receive c  m. Thus, it might submit a relatively high bid
for project L; since it is, at least partially, insured against losing the rst auction. In particular,
a rm with a cost advantage7 for project M knows that the largest payo¤ it can receive is c m
from being the only bidder for projectM since its largest payo¤ in auction L is c  l which must
be smaller due to the rms cost advantage. Thus, provided the rm decides to participate in
auction L; it seeks to lose the rst auction and minimizes its chances of winning project L by
submitting the highest feasible bid which simultaneously maximizes its payo¤ from accidentally
winning it. In contrast, if a rm has a cost advantage for project L; then it tops its completion
cost l with its certain return from auction M and uses this revised cost parameter   l+ c m
6Cf. Vickrey (1961), McAfee and McMillan (1987a) or Milgrom (1989) for a description of the rst-price
sealed-bid auction design.
7Recall that the term cost advantage refers to a comparison across projects rather than a comparison across
rms.
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l= l+c - m
bL(l) < c
skip L
l > g(m) ?
l ³ m?
l > c
bL(l) = c
yes
yes
no
no
if lost
in L
if lost
in L
only bidder:
bM(m)= c
competition:
bM(m)< c
Entry Decision Bidding in L Bidding in M
Figure 1: Equilibrium structure of the sequential procurement auction game
in auction L. Intuitively it uses its total cost of executing project L that include the direct
project cost l and the opportunity cost of winning project L, c  m (=benet of not-winning
auction L): Any rm taking part in auction L treats c   m as a safe prot. In case it wins
project L, it pays the cost of executing this project and repaysthe amount c m.
If there is no bidding competition in the auction for project M; then any rm bidding for
it submits the maximum feasible bid to maximize prots. If it is not the only bidder then it
receives the additional information that its competitor did not enter auction L, too. In response
it updates its belief about its competitors cost parameter for project M since skipping auction
L might not be equilibrium behavior for every type. The appropriate a posteriori pdf is denoted
by fM jSkip(m) and gives the (equilibrium) density that a rm with completion cost realization m
for project M bids only in auction M: Put di¤erently, fM jSkip(m) is the marginal pdf of f(l;m)
conditional on the fact that completion cost pair (l;m) leads the rm to skip auction L.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium structure of the game.
Proposition 2 Equilibrium bidding functions in auctions L and M
The equilibrium bidding functions of a rm with completion cost pair (l;m) 2 [c; c]2 are given
by:
(a) bL() =
8<: c if l  m+ R c [1  F(x)] dx= [1  F()] otherwise
if it submits a bid for project L where   l+c m and F(x) =
R x
c
R c
c+c  f(m c+;m) dmd
with x 2 [c; c].
(b) bM (m) =
8<: c if it is the only bidderm+ R cm 1  FM jSkip(x) dx= 1  FM jSkip(m) otherwise
if it submits a bid for project M where fM jSkip(x) =
hR c
g(x) f(l; x) dl
i
=
hR c
c
R c
g(t) f(l; t) dl dt
i
and
FM jSkip(x) =
R x
c fM jSkip(s) ds and g(x) denotes the competitors entry indi¤erence curve.
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Proof
Consider rst part (b): Before bidding for auction M , any rm knows if its competitor won
auction L. If the competitor entered auction L, the rm remains the only bidder in auction
M and maximizes its return by submitting the largest feasible bid equaling c. If, however, its
competitor skipped auction L; the rm infers that its competitors completion cost pair must
satisfy L > g(M) (to be determined later) and Bayesian updating of the rms cost belief
regarding its competitor leads to the a posteriori pdf fM jSkip(x): Appealing to lemma 1 leads to
bM (m).
For (a), note that a rm receives c m in auctionM if it loses auction L. If its completion costs
satisfy m  l then it cannot receive a larger return in auction L; c m  c  l by assumption.
Thus the rm chooses to receive the largest feasible return from auction L by bidding c which
also maximizes the frequency it ends up with the larger return from auction M , provided it
submits a bid for project L:
In case the rm has a cost advantage for project L, i.e. l < m, its expected prot from
participating in auction L with any bid bL1 2 [c¯ ; c] and possibly in auction M is given by
E[L+M1 j l1 < m1] = (bL1   l1) Pr(bL1 wins auction L) + (c m1) 

1  Pr(bL1 wins auction L)

:
Using rm 1s total cost parameter 1  l1 + c m1; this can be rewritten as
E[L+M1 j l1 < m1] = (bL1   1)  Pr(bL1 wins auction L) + c m1
From rm 1s perspective c  m1 is a known constant and its expected prot from bidding in
auction L, E[L+M1 j l1 < m1], is maximized if bL1 maximizes
Z(1) := (b
L
1   1)  Pr(bL1 wins auction L) (2)
where l1 < m1 , 1 < c by denition. Suppose there exists a symmetric equilibrium bidding
function bL() that maximizes Z such that it is strictly increasing for  < c, bL() < c for  < c,
and bL() = c for   c. Since bL() is strictly increasing on [c
¯
; c], there exists an inverse on
that domain denoted by b 1;L(bL). Given that rm 1s competitor adheres to this equilibrium
bidding function, rm 1 (with a cost advantage for project L) wins always the rst round if
its competitor has a cost advantage for project M; 2  c: It wins project L too, if it bids an
amount that corresponds to a lower total cost type 1 = b 1;L(bL) than the one of its competitor
2. Denoting the cdf of total cost types by F(); (2) can be rewritten as8
Z(1) = (b
L
1   1) 

1  F(b 1;L(bL1 ))

(3)
8Here the fact is used that types with a cost advantage for project L always enter the rst auction. This is
formally conrmed in lemma 4.
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where f() =
R c
c+c  f(m c+;m) dm and F(c) = 1=2. If bL1 maximizes Z then @Z=@bL1 = 0
and di¤erentiation of (3) at the optimum w.r.t. 1 yields
dZ
d1
=   1  F(b 1;L(bL1 ) :
Integration in the boundaries [1; c] together with the fact that in a Nash equilibrium bL1 must
coincide with the value of the equilibrium bidding function at the true cost type 1 leads to
Z(c)  Z(1) =  
Z c
1
[1  F(x)] dx:
Since bL(c) = c, we have Z(c) = 0 and obtain with (3) at its optimum the equilibrium bidding
function for 1 < c:
bL(1) = 1 +
R c
1
[1  F(x)] dx
1  F(1)

2.2 Entry Decision
In this section, we derive the entry indi¤erence curve (1) under the assumption of equilibrium
bidding that is summarized in proposition 2. Obviously the expected prot from bidding in
auction L and possibly in auction M , E[L+M1 j (l1;m1)], always exceeds the expected prot
from skipping auction L; E[M1 jm1] if rm 1 has a cost advantage for project L (i.e. l1  m1):
the expected prot from entering auction L and possibly M is at least as large as c   m1.
To see this suppose that the rm would bid c in auction L. Then it receives in expectation
(c  l1) Pr(won L)+(c m1) Pr(lost L) c m1. For any bid in auctionM , the expected prot
from skipping L; E[M1 jm1]; must be lower than c   m1 since there is a positive probability
of bidding competition in auction M . It follows that (1) can only hold if lcrit1 > m1 and that
without loss of generality the entry indi¤erence curve is dened by:
E
h
L+M1 j
 
lcrit1 > m1;m1
i
= E

M1 jm1

: (4)
In order to explicitly state equation (4), consider rst its left-hand side. A rm with a cost
advantage for project M that enters auction L bids c in auction L and if it loses c in auction M .
This strategy results in four events summarized in the next table where the probabilities depend
on rm 1s belief that rm 2 acts in accordance with the entry indi¤erence curve g2(M2).
Events if rm 1 bids c in auction L Payo¤ Probability
A it is the only bidder c  l1 Pr (L2 > g2(M2) )
B the competitor bids c and rm 1 wins L c  l1 Pr (g2(M2)  L2 M2 )0:5
C the competitor bids c and rm 1 loses L c m1 Pr (g2(M2)  L2 M2 )0:5
D the competitor bids less than c c m1 Pr (L2 < M2 )
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Hence the expected benet to a rm with a cost advantage for project M from starting
bidding for project L with bL = c and then continuing bidding in auctionM after losing auction
L is given by
E
h
L+M1 j (l1 > m1;m1)
i
=
cZ
c
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2  ( c  l1) (A)
+
cZ
c
g2(m2)Z
m2
f(l2;m2)
2
dl2 dm2  [2c  (l1 +m1)] (B+C)
+
cZ
c
m2Z
c
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2  ( c m1) (D)
Now, consider the right-hand side of (4). If rm 1 skips auction L there are three events
depending on the entry behavior of its competitor. Again rm 1 assesses the probabilities of
these events given its belief about the competitors entry indi¤erence curve g(M2):
Events if rm 1 skips auction L Payo¤ Probability
E no bidding competition c m1 Pr (L2  g2(M2) )
F rm 1 wins project M bM (m1) m1 Pr(M2 > m1 ^L2 > g2(M2))
G the competitor wins project M 0 Pr(M2 < m1 ^L2 > g2(M2))
Thus the expected benet to rm 1 with a cost advantage for project M from skipping
bidding for project L can be written as:
E[M1 jm1] = (c m1)
cZ
c
g2(m2)Z
c
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 (E)
+
cZ
m1
cZ
g2(m2)

bM (m1) m1
  f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 (F+G)
A standard result in auction theory is that in rst-price sealed-bid auctions bids are formed such
that they equal the expected second-order statistic from the relevant type pool (conditional on
the own type being the rst-order statistic). Thus, bM (m1) in the last term in E[M1 jm1] can
be substituted by m2. This is formally conrmed by lemma 3 implying:
E[M1 jm1] = (c m1)
cZ
c
g2(m2)Z
c
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 (5)
+
cZ
m1
cZ
g2(m2)
(m2  m1)  f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
Clearly E[M1 jm1] decreases in m1 and is independent of l1.
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Lemma 3 Firm 1s expected prot from equilibrium bidding in auction M if there is bidding
competition and bM1 = b
M (m1) is equal to the expected prot from bidding the expected second-
order statistic of completion costs given that rm 1s completion costs are the lowest, i.e.
cZ
m1
cZ
g2(m2)
 
bM1  m1
  f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 = cZ
m1
cZ
g2(m2)
(m2  m1)  f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2:
Proof See the appendix.
Lemma 4 Boundaries of the entry indi¤erence curve g(m)
Let lcrit1 = g1(m1) be implicitly dened by E[
L+M
1 j(lcrit1 ;m1)] = E[M1 jm1]: If g1(m1) exists,
then m1 < g1(m1) < c for m1 2 [c, c) and g1(c) = c.
Proof See the appendix.
The existence of the entry indi¤erence curve in symmetric equilibrium is veried in propo-
sition 5 where also its properties are given. Its proof contains a di¤erential equation whose
solution is the symmetric equilibrium indi¤erence curve g(m). Figure 2 illustrates these results
for a representative rm with completion cost pair (l;m).
Proposition 5 For the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterized by the represen-
tative rms strategy [bL(l;m), bM (m), "(m)] and the density function f(l;m):
(a) There exists a (nonempty) compact and convex set of completion cost pairs where a rm
bids for project L although it has a cost advantage for completing project M . This subset
is dened by G = f(l;m) 2 [c; c]2 jm  l  g(m)g.
(b) The critical value function g(m) exists and
(i) m < g(m) < c if m 2 [c; c), g(c) = c, g(c) >c,
(ii) g0(m) > 0,
(iii) g00(m) < 0 if m 2 [c; c) and g00(c) = 0.
Proof See the appendix.
Consideration of proposition 5 leads to the conclusion that any rm always enters auction L
if it faces a cost advantage for this project; i.e. l  m: Then it earns at least c m while skipping
auction L leaves it with running the risk of lower prots in case its competitor also skipped the
rst auction resulting in lower expected prots of this strategy. In contrast, a cost advantage
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Figure 2: Equilibrium entry behavior
for completing project M implies the impossibility of the rm to secure itself the same return in
auction L as it could earn in auction M being the only bidder. However, if the competing rm
has a strong cost advantage for project M and skipped auction L; then there is competition in
the second auction with the risk of low or even zero prots due to aggressive bidding. Therefore
a rm may wish to participate in the rst auction and win the unloved project L at a high
price to insure itself against low prots resulting from erce competition in the second auction,
although it actually prefers losing the auction for project L:
Although our sequential auction model is highly stylized in the sense that we assume just
two bidders implying that there is the possibility of being the sole bidder in the second auction,
we conjecture that our results seem to apply also for a more general number of bidders. The
reason why there appears an endogenous option value in the rst auction, inuencing equilibrium
bidding for auction L and equilibrium non-entry, is that a non-winning bidder in the rst auction
anticipates a certain prot in the second auction when it will be the only bidder. If there are
more than two bidders in the model, there is always competition in the second auction. However,
there remains an option value generated by the opportunity to bid in the second auction which,
in this case, is not a xed payment but rather an uncertain payment that is xed in expectation.
Given such an option value, there are bidders, e.g. those faced with maximum cost if completing
the rst project, that prefer to skip the rst auction and only bid in the second one. It follows
that our results do not hinge on the number of bidders.
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3 Payo¤ and Revenue Equivalence
In this section we state a revenue equivalence result for our sequential auction model with non-
identical bidder costs across projects. For a sequential auction of identical objects with bidders
that demand a single object, revenue equvialence holds (Weber, 1983; Maskin and Riley, 1989).
For our auction model it is a priori unclear if a similiar revenue equivalence result continues to
apply since in our model bidderscost types for various projects are non-identical.
For a sequence of two completely unrelated standard auctions, i.e. two subsequent one-shot
auctions, it is obvious that revenue equvialence holds in each of the stageauctions (Myerson,
1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981). In our sequence of auctions, the number of bidders in the
rst stage auction is not xed and the number of buyers in the second stage auction is unknown
ex ante9, so that our result extends standard revenue equivalence.
Following Riley and Samuelson (1981), we impose the following ve properties on auction
designs adapted to our context that guarantee revenue equivalence for a class of auctions. Prop-
erty A5 is motivated by our procurement context where we require the buyer to compensate any
typescost but not more and not less.
A1 The project buyer accepts a bid of every rm unless it exceeds the largest feasible bid.
A2 The project is awarded to a rm that submits the lowest bid.
A3 The auction design does only discriminate between bidders on the basis of submitted bids.
A4 There exists a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium with an increasing bidding function.
A5 The auction design pays only amounts in the interval [c
¯
,c] to a bidding rm. Furthermore,
it guarantees that the highest cost-type receives a compensation equal to its cost c.
Denition 6 Auction class   comprises all auction designs satisfying properties A1 A5.
Lemma 7 Expected prot if skipping auction L.
(a) No competition in M: Suppose that there is a single bidder in the second auction M. Then,
the bidders expected prot is given by MjNC1 (m1) = c m1.
(b) Competition in M: Suppose that there are two bidders in the second auction M. Then,
bidder 1s expected prot is given by MjC1 (m1jg2(:)) =
R c
m1
[1   FM jSkip(s)] ds where the
distribution is dened as in proposition 2.
9 In the rst stage auction the number of bidders is 0, 1 or 2; in the second stage auction it is either 1 or 2.
13
(c) Ex ante prot from skipping auction L: Suppose that a bidder considers skipping the rst
auction L. Then, his expected prot is given by E[M jm1; g2(:)] = pskipjg2(:)  MjC1 (m1) +
1  pskipjg2(:) MjNC1 (m1jg2(:)) where pskipjg2(:) denotes the probability that the competitor
skips the rst auction implying competition in the second auction conditional on entry
behavior of the competitor, i.e. pskipjg2(:) =
R c
c
R c
g2(m)
f(l;m) dl dm.
Proof
(a) By A5, the largest buyer payment to a rm is c since the auction design guarantees that the
project cost of the highest cost-type is fully covered. If there is no competition, the only bidder
bids such that it pretends to have to incur maximum cost c which it precisely receives.
(b) In auctionM with competition, there are two bidders that have observed that the competitor
did not enter auction L. Each bidder updates the distribution about competitors cost for
completing project M resulting in FM jSkip. Since this is a standard one-shot auction in the last
stage of the sequential auction game, the result immediately follows. [See the referees appendix,
page 7.3.]
(c) The given expression is the denition of the expected rms prot if skipping auction L. 
Proposition 8 (Payo¤ equivalence) If the two auction designs utilized in auctions L and M
are in class  , each rm receives the same expected equilibrium prot and there is invariance of
equilibrium entry behavior.
Proof
We have to show that each cost type (l1;m1) receives the same expected prot in equilibrium.
Our strategy of proof is as follows: First, we show that a rm with a cost advantage for the
rst project, i.e. l1 < m1, always enters the rst auction and receives the same expected prot
from its equilibrium strategy enter L and possibly M (where l1 < m1) independently of the
auction designs utilized in L and M . Second, we show that for a given entry indi¤erence curve,
changes in the auction design do not change expected prots from the strategies enter L and
possibly M (where l1  m1)and skip L.
1. If a rm with a cost advantage for the rst project, i.e. l1 < m1, does not enter the
rst auction, its expected prot cannot exceed c m1 due to the fact that c is the largest
payment that any auction design in class   allows. However, since c  l1 > c m1, entering
the rst auction always o¤ers the possibility to earn a higher expected prot if entering
the rst auction.
Now we derive the expected equilibrium prot if a rm with a cost advantage for project
L enters the rst auction. Let the specic payment rule according to auction design L to
bidder 1 be given by the function L(bL1 ; b
L
2 ) where b
L
i species the bid of bidder i in auction
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L. Assuming that there exists an equilibrium bidding strategy bL : R ! R [ fno entryg
that is strictly increasing on [c
¯
; c] and that rm 2 follows where 2 = l2 + c m2, rm 1s
expected payment from imitating type x1 in auction L is RL(x1) = E[L(bL(x1); bL(2))]
and the rms equilibrium prot is:
E[L+M jl1 < m1] = RL(x1)  Prfwin Lg l1 + [1  Prfwin Lg] (c m1)
which can be rewritten as
E[L+M jl1 < m1] = RL(x1)  [1  F(x1)]1 + c m1
where 1 = l1 + c   m1 and F(:) is dened as in proposition 2. E[L+M jl1 < m1] is
maximized if Q = RL(x1)   [1   F(x1)]1 is maximized. Q can be interpreted as the
expected prot if opportunity costs are included. Maximizing Q leads to the following
FOC for all 1 2 [c¯; c) at the Nash optimum 1 = x1
dRL(x1)
dx1
=  dF(x1)
dx1
1:
After substituting the Nash condition 1 = x1 and integration in the boundaries [1; c] we
obtain
RL(1) = R
L(c) +
Z c
1
s dF(s): (6)
Note that RL(1) is discontinuous at 1 = c and the left-side limit is lim
1!c 
= c2 .
10 If
1 = c the rm bids as if it faces maximum cost for project L and receives payment c if
it wins the auction. However, it wins the auction only if rm 2 has no cost advantage for
project L and skips the auction or if it is favored by a fair coin ip due to a bidding tie.
It follows that the probability that the rm wins c is strictly less than 1/2 implying the
discontinuity of RL (1). Since RL(c) in equation (6) is the upper limit of an integral, we
can use its left-side limit to substitute it in (6) which yields after integration by parts of
the second term
RL(1) = c  F(1)1  
Z c
1
F(s) ds if l1 < m1 , 1 < c.
The expression RL(1) gives the expected equilibrium payment in auction L to rm 1
faced with a cost advantage for project L. Since a rms cost type is invariant to changes
of the auction design, it follows that the expected prot for rms with a cost advantage
for project L is independent of the particular auction design if it is in class  .
10Every type  2 [c
¯
; ] with  = 2c  c
¯
, or equivalently each type with no cost advantage for auction L,
i.e. l  m, either skips auction L or bids as if having maximum cost c for project L. It follows from the
increasing bidding function bL(:) that every rm with a cost advantage for auction L ( < c) wins the auction
if the competitor has no cost advantage for project L (  c). The probability that the competitor has no cost
advantage for project L is 1/2. Since the highest auction payment in auction L to a bidder with maximum cost
is c, the expected payment from bidding in auction L converges to c=2 as a rms type approaches c.
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2. Using the fact that only rms with no cost advantage for project L skip the rst auction
(see the rst part of the given proof), the entry indi¤erence curve is dened by
E[L+M j(lcrit > m;m)] = E[M jm] (7)
where lcrit = g(m). For the setting where both auctions are in the rst-price design,
we have already shown that there exists an entry indi¤erence curve, here denoted by
gfp(m), such that (7) holds. Here we show that, given entry indi¤erence curve gfp(:), any
combination of auction designs in class   utilized in auctions L andM , leaves the expected
payo¤s E[L+M j(l > m;m); gfp(:)] and E[M jm; gfp(:)] una¤ected, so that (7) continues
to hold and gfp(:) is an equilibrium entry indi¤erence curve for any combination of auctions
designs in  . Lemma 7 demonstrates that E[M jm; gfp(:)] is invariant to arbitrary changes
of the auction designs. To see that E[L+M j(l > m;m); g2(:)] is invariant to arbitrary
changes of the auction design, consider its denition:
E
h
L+M1 j (l1 > m1;m1) ; g2(:)
i
= pskipjg2(:)  ( c  l1) (A)
+

1
2
  pskipjg2(:)

 c  l1 + c m1
2
(B)
+
1
2
 ( c m1) (C)
The rst line A corresponds to the event that the other rm skips the rst auction. Since
the rm has no cost advantage for the project L, it bids in auction L as if it has maximum
cost for project L and therefore receives in the event of winning auction L the payment
c. With probability of 12 , the competitor has no cost advantage for project L. It follows
that the probability that the rm has no cost advantage and does not skip auction L
is 12   pskipjg2(:). In this event, line B, there is a bidding tie in auction L that is fairly
resolved. The third line, C, gives the expected prot if the competitor has a cost advantage
for project L and, hence, bids as if it is a better cost type than c and always wins the
rst auction. Then, rm 1 is the only bidder in the second auction and receives c  
m1. Since these arguments are independent of utilitzed auction designs, the invariance of
E
h
L+M1 j (l1 > m1;m1) ; g2(:)
i
completes the proof. 
Corollary 9 For any combination of auction designs utilized in class   for auctions L and M ,
there is revenue equivalence in the sense that each rm receives the same expected payment in
each stage auction implying that expected prices and buyers expected payo¤s are constant in
each stage auction.
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4 The Impact of Endogenous Outside Options on Bidding Be-
havior
The standard one-shot procurement auction model abstracts from further procurement contracts
o¤ered. For capacity-constrained rms, these alternative transaction opportunities create out-
side options that a¤ect bidding behavior. In the rst auction of our sequential auction game, the
second auction endogenizes a rms outside option. The second auction with competition di¤ers
from the standard SIPV model in that both bidders receive a signal about their competitors
cost structure since they observe that their competitor did not bid for the rst auction. Here,
we analyze how the option value created by the second auction a¤ects bidding behavior in the
rst auction of our dynamic model. Furthermore, we explore and discuss how bidding behavior
in both stages of our dynamic model di¤ers from bidding behavior in the static SIPV model.
The option value that a rm places on the opportunity to participate in the second auction
depends on a rms completion cost for the second project. In particular, if a rm bids in the
rst auction its opportunity cost of winning is c m since not winning the rst auction implies
that it remains the only bidder in the second auction. We refer to this opportunity cost as the
rms option value.
To see how a rm revises its bid for the rst project in response to changes in its option
value, consider a specic example where completion costs are uniformly distributed, (l;m) 
U [20; 100]2. (For referees only: The details of derivation and the equilibrium solutions are
relegated to the refereesappendix, see p. 27¤.) Figure 3 highlights that equilibrium bidding
functions for project L vary with the completion cost for the second project, m. It depicts the
bidding functions for the values m = 80 and m = 100. Obviously, decreases in the option value
shift the bidding function downwards. Intuitively, as the rm is faced with larger completion
costs for the second project, its option value of winning the second auction declines leading it to
place more aggressive bids in the rst auction. It follows that option value heterogeneity implies
asymmetric equilibrium bidding functions for the rst auction. Proposition 10 establishes this
result independently of the underlying distribution.
Proposition 10 In the auction for project L, a rms equilibrium bid increases in its option
value created by the subsequent auction.
Proof The option value of participating in the second auction subsequently to not win-
ning the rst auction equals c   m. Since c is constant, we obtain @bL(l;m)=@(c   m) =
 @bL(l;m)=@m: Di¤erentiating the equilibrium bidding function bL() with  = l+c m leads
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to
@bL(l;m)
@m
=
8<:  
f()
R c
 [1 F(x)] dx
[1 F ()]2 < 0 if l < m
0 otherwise
:
As a rms completion cost m decreases, the option value of participating in the second auction,
c m, increases. Thus, rms with a cost advantage for the rst project bid less aggressively for
project L: 
Next we compare bidding behavior in the rst auction of the dynamic model with bidding
behavior in the static SIPV model using any bivariate uniform distribution of cost pairs with
support [c
¯
; c]2. In the static SIPV model, the bidding function for the example is b(l) = 50+0:5l:
This bidding function is depicted in Figure 3, too. As can be readily seen from the Figure, the
SIPV bidding function b(l) lies substantially below all bidding functions for the rst auction in
the sequential model since bL(l;m = 100) constitutes their lower bound due to @bL=@m < 0.
Interestingly, the lower bound of bidding for project L in the sequential model substantially
exceeds the SIPV bidding function, although a rm with the most unfavourable completion cost
for projectM , m = 100 , has option value zero and faces virtually no second auction. The reason
why the bidding functions bL(l;m = 100) and b(l) do not coincide lies in the fact that the rms
competitor does not know that the rm has unfavourable completion cost for projectM and bids
less aggressively due to its own option value. It follows that the static SIPV model is no special
case of our dynamic auction model with an option value equal to zero. The result that bidding
behavior is always more relaxed in the rst auction of our dynamic model as compared to bidding
behavior in the static SIPV model holds for any bivariate uniform distribution (proposition 11a.)
l20
20
100
88
60
100
b(l)86 bL(l,m=100)
bL(l,m=80)
50
bL(l,m)
Figure 3: Bidding for project L
The comparison of bidding behavior in the static SIPV model with bidding in the second
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auction under competition leads to the reverse result: bidding in the second auction is always
more aggressive than in the static SIPV model (proposition 11b) due to endogenous type selec-
tion. Since relatively more low-cost types skip the rst auction, in the second auction any rm
expects its competitor to have a lower cost than in the SIPV model.
Proposition 11 For any bivariate uniform distribution with quadratic support,
(a) equilibrium bidding in the rst auction is less aggressive than in the static SIPV model,
(b) equilibrium bidding in the second auction with competition where both bidders are present is
more aggressive than in the static SIPV model.
Proof. See the appendix. 
The main insight here is that bidding behavior is crucially inuenced by the existence of
outside options, independently of the auction stage. This carries over to the case of general
distributions. However, the particular e¤ects that bidding in the rst (second) auction is always
less (more) aggressive than in the SIPV model do not necessarily hold. To see this, consider
the SIPV model where a rm bids the expected cost of its competitor given that it submits the
lower bid (which is equivalent to having the lower cost type.) Suppose now that the competitor
is endowed with some option value, transforming the SIPV auction into the rst stage of the
dynamic model. Again, the rm bids the expected cost of its competitor now including oppor-
tunity cost given that it submits the lower bid. Ceteris paribus, the rms bid increases since
all competitors cost types that have a larger cost in the SIPV model have an even larger cost
if the option value is included. However, lower cost types that are ignored by the rm in the
SIPV model become larger (opportunity-cost augmented) cost types in the rst auction of the
dynamic model. Some of these inated cost types now exceed the rms cost level potentially
biasing downwards expected cost given that the rm submits the lower bid. In the special case,
where the rm has the lowest cost type in the SIPV model and wins always, there is no ambigu-
ous e¤ect on bids since there are no lower cost types. Thus, for the lowest cost type bidding
is always more aggressive in the SIPV model. However, bidding functions of the SIPV model
and the rst auction of the dynamic model may intersect for other cost types leading to the
counterintuitive result that some rms may bid more aggressively once faced with a su¢ ciently
small outside option. To demonstrate this case consider the following bivariate pdf:
f(l;m) =
8<:
(e2l 120+e120 2l) (e2m 120+e120 2m)
(e80 e 80)2 ; if (l;m) 2 [20; 100]2
0 otherwise
:
In Figure 4, we plot the equilibrium bidding function in the SIPV model and the lower bound of
bidding functions in the rst auction of the dynamic model for completion cost levels l 2 [20; 22]
for this distribution. Bidding functions for both models intersect at l = 21:06.
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Figure 4: Intersecting equilibrium bidding functions
5 Conclusion
Motivated by recent empirical evidence that suggests that (1) rms perceive independent one-
shot procurement auctions not in isolation but rather as an auction sequence, that (2) sub-
contracting isnt perfect and that (3) rms are aware of their opportunity cost, this paper has
introduced a sequential procurement auction model to study rmsrst-price equilibrium bid-
ding strategies. In contrast to a procurement auction version of Weber (1983) and Elmaghraby
(2003), the presented model predicts that rms not always participate in early auctions. In
addition bidding behavior in each auction stage strongly depends on the option value that a
rm places on remaining auctions contrasting with a procurement auction version of the stan-
dard SIPV model. If real-world rms would regard auction stages in a sequence of auction as
one-shot games and, thus, would ignore alternative transaction opportunites, the focus on the
standard SIPV model is appropriate. The experimental data generated by the implementation
of our procurement auction model in the laboratory, see Brosig and Reiss (2007), suggest that
the option value of alternative transaction opportunities strongly inuences bidding and entry
behavior in the lab similiarly to the theoretical predictions and renders our approach relevant.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of lemma 3
Noting that m1 and bM1 are constants and substitution for the latter according to proposition 2
leads toR c
m1

1  FM2jSkip(x)

dx
1  FM2jSkip(m1)

cZ
m1
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 =
cZ
m1
(m2  m1)
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
Since 1 FM2jSkip(x) =
"
cR
x
R c
g2(s)
f(l2; s) dl2 ds
#
=
hR c
c
R c
g2(t)
f(l2; t) dl2 dt
i
we obtain from the last
equation
cZ
m1
cZ
x
cZ
g2(s)
f(l2; s) dl2 ds dx =
cZ
m1
(m2  m1)
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2:
Let (m2) be the integral of
R c
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2; then integration by parts of the right-hand
side using
R R c
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 = (c) 
R c
m2
R c
g2(u)
f(l2; u) dl2 du leads to
cZ
m1
cZ
x
cZ
g2(s)
f(l2; s) dl2 ds dx =
cZ
m1
cZ
m2
cZ
g2(s)
f(l2; s) dl2 ds dm2
which obviously holds. 
6.2 Proof of lemma 4
Suppose g1(m1) = c, then rm 1 always enters auction L. For l1 = c, the rm never makes
any prot from project L such that the strategy to enter auction L and continuing bidding in
auction M if possible is protable only if it doesnt win project L resulting in the same prot
as if the rm had skipped auction L. If the competitor has a cost advantage for project M ,
it either bids c for project L or skips the auction. In both cases, rm 1 wins project L with
positive probability although it could have won the protable auction M in some cases since
m1 < c such that E[L+M1 j(l1 = c;m1 < c)] < E[M1 jm1 < c]: Since g1(m1) > c leads to the
same entry strategy as g1(m1) = c implies, it follows that g1(m1) < c for m1 2 [c, c):
For g1(m1) < c it follows immediately from (5) that E[M1 jm1 < c] < c   m1. If rm 1 has
no cost advantage for project M , i.e. l1  m1; according to proposition 2 its bidding behavior
guarantees it at least prot c m1 for each feasible completion cost pair of its competitor, thus
E[L+M1 jl1  m1 < c]  c m1: Therefore, g1(m1) > m1, m1 2 [c, c):
If m1 = c, then the denition of g1(m1) directly implies g1(c) = c: To see this note that
E[M1 jm1 = c)] = 0 and E[L+M1 j(c; c)] = 0 while E[L+M1 j(l1 < c; c)] > 0 which completes the
proof. 
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6.3 Proof of proposition 5
In order to determine the entry indi¤erence curve lcrit1 = g1(m1) it is su¢ cient to consider
entry condition (1) for rms with a cost advantage for project M since, according to lemma
4, for all other types expected prots strictly exceed opportunity costs. Thus, substitution of
the denitions of expected prots from both entry strategies into (4) leads with some minor
algebraic manipulations11 using the properties of f(l;m) to the implicit denition of the entry
indi¤erence curve lcrit1 = g(m1):
c m1
2
+
2c   lcrit1 +m1
2
2641
2
 
cZ
c
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
375+  c  lcrit1  cZ
c
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
(8)
  (c m1)
cZ
c
g2(m2)Z
c
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2  
cZ
m1
cZ
g2(m2)
(m2  m1)  f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 = 0:
Part (b) of the proposition directly implies the existence and the claimed properties of set
G in (a). Therefore it is su¢ cient to show the existence of g(m) satisfying (i)-(iii) to prove the
proposition.
The implicit-function theorem implies existence and di¤erentiability of lcrit1 = g1(m1) as dened
by (8) for any function g2(m2). In a symmetric equilibrium, both rms act in accordance with
the same equilibrium entry indi¤erence curve denoted by g(m): Thus g1(m) = g2(m) = g(m)
and (i) follows from lemma 4. Again, using symmetry of equilibrium entry behavior with identity
(8) and subsequent di¤erentiation w.r.t. m leads to
 g
0(m)
2
cZ
c
cZ
g(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2   g
0(m)
4
+
1
4
  1
2
cZ
c
cZ
g(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 (9)
+
cZ
m
cZ
g(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 = 0:
By (i)
cR
c
cR
g(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 <
cR
c
cR
m2
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2 where the latter equals 1/2, identity
(9) implies g0(m) > 0 as claimed in (ii).
Di¤erentiation of (9) w.r.t. m yields
 g
00(m)
2
cZ
c
cZ
g(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2   g
00(m)
4
 
cZ
g(m)
f(l2;m) dl2 = 0
implying (iii). 
11See the refereesappendix.
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6.4 Proof of proposition 11
(a) We have to show that the di¤erence between the bidding function of our dynamic model for
the rst auction and the bidding function of the static SIPV model is positive for any bivariate
uniform distribution with pdf f(l;m) = 1= (c  c
¯
)2 8 (l;m) 2 [c
¯
; c]2  R2+. Since there exists a
continuum of bidding functions for project L depending on the particular realization of the cost
parameter for the second project, m, and bids decrease in m (proposition 10), it is su¢ cient to
show that the di¤erence is positive for the largest cost parameter m = c, i.e.
(l)  bL(l;m = c)  b(l) > 0; l 2 [c
¯
; c);
where equilibrium bidding functions are dened in proposition 2 and lemma 1. The pdf in the
static SIPV model is given by the marginal density function of the bivariate uniform distribution
with respect to L, i.e. h(l)  R cc f(l;m) dm. Clearly, (l = c) = 0. Since rms with a cost
advantage for the second project, l  m, submit the largest feasible bid c in the auction for
project L and bids always fall below c in the SIPV model, b(l < c) < c, it is su¢ cient to focus on
rms with a cost advantage for the rst project, i.e. l < m. Then, the di¤erence in equilibrium
bids is given by
(l) =
Z c
l
[1  F(x)] dx= [1  F(l)] 
Z c
l
[1 H(x)] dx= [1 H(l)]
recalling that   l + c  m. Here, the particular cdfs are F(x) = (x c¯ )
2=2(c c
¯
)2, x 2 [c
¯
; c];
and H(x) = (x c
¯
)=(c c
¯
); x 2 [c
¯
; c]: Integrating and rearranging leads to
(l) =
1
6
(c  l)A1
A2
;
A1 = 4c
2   2cl   6cc+ l2 + 3c2;
A2 = 2c
2   4cc+ c2   l2 + 2cl:
Note that A1 and A2 are always positive and monotone decreasing since A1(l = c) = 4(c  c)2;
A1(l = c) = 3(c   c)2; and @A1=@l = 2(l   c); A2(l = c) = 2(c   c)2; A2(l = c) = (c   c)2; and
@A2=@l = 2(c  l): This conrms that (l) > 0 8 l 2 [c¯ ; c) proving part (a) of the proposition:
(b) Analogously to part (a), we have to show that the di¤erence between the bidding function
of our dynamic model for the second auction and the bidding function of the static SIPV model
is negative for any bivariate uniform distribution. Here, the bidding di¤erence is dened by
(m) 
Z c
m

1  FM jSkip(x)

dx=

1  FM jSkip(m)
 Z c
m
[1 H(x)] dx= [1 H(m)] ; m 2 [c
¯
; c):
where FM jSkip(x) is dened in proposition 2 and H(x) is given above. Again (m = c) = 0.
Using the distributions under the uniformity assumption and rearranging leads to
(m) =
  R cm R cx g(s) ds dx+ c m2 R cm g(s) dsR c
m [c  g(s)] ds
:
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Since the denominator is strictly positive for any m 2 [c
¯
; c), proposition 5b(i), it is su¢ cient
to show that the numerator is strictly negative. Using the fact that (c   m)=2 R cm g(s) ds =
1=2
R c
m
R c
x g(s) ds dx+ 1=2
R c
m
R x
m g(s) ds dx, (m) < 0 8m 2 [c¯ ; c) ifZ c
m
Z c
x
g(s) ds dx 
Z c
m
Z x
m
g(s) ds dx > 0: (10)
Notice that the integral on the left side is equivalent to
R c
m
R c
c x+m g(s) ds dx changing the di-
rection of integration. Rewriting (10) leads toZ c
m
Z x
m
g(s+ c  x) 
Z x
m
g(s) ds

dx > 0:
Since the entry indi¤erence curve g() is strictly increasing, proposition 5b(ii), c   x > 0 8x 2
(m; c), and the inner integrals cancel at m and c, the inequality always holds for m 2 [c
¯
; c). 
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7 RefereesAppendix
7.1 Proof of lemma 1
The given proof is intended to make it comparable to the proof of our proposition (2) and is
not exactly that of Cohen and Loeb (1990). However the method we use here is a minor variant
of the standard method to derive the symmetric equilibrium function in a rst-price sealed bid
auction with independent and private valuations for the procurement context.12
There are n risk-neutral rms whose project completion costs are private information and
distributed independently and identically following pdf h : [c,c] ! R+ where H(x) denotes
the corresponding cdf. It is assumed that the symmetric equilibrium bidding function, b(c), is
strictly monotonically increasing in c. All rms participate in a procurement auction which is
rst-price sealed-bid such that the lowest bid wins. There is no entry fee and the upper bound
for bids is c;otherwise there is the possibility of an innite amount the procurer might have to
pay for contract completion. Since bids are increasing in project costs, the rm with the lowest
cost type wins the project and receives its winning bid as payment.
Suppose all n  1 rms bid according to b(c), then rm 1s expected payment is given by
1 = (b1   c1) 

1 H(b 1(b1))
n 1
: (11)
The di¤erence b1  c1 is rm 1s surplus if it wins the auction which is multiplied by its winning
probability associated with bid b1: Particularly,

1 H(b 1(b1))
n 1 is the probability that all
other rms have larger costs than b 1(b1) being the cost type corresponding to the bid of rm
1. If b1 is chosen such that (11) is maximized, then total di¤erentiation of 1 w.r.t. c1 leads at
the optimum by @1=@b1 = 0 to
d1
dc1
=   1 H(b 1(b1))n 1
Integration of this expression in the boundaries [c1, c] yields
1(c)  1(c1) =  
Z c
c1
[1 H(x)]n 1 dx
using the fact that in a Nash equilibrium rm 1s prot maximizing bid b1 must coincide with
the value of the equilibrium bidding function at its true cost type. Noting that a rm with
maximum completion costs cannot make any money, 1(c) = 0, we have
1(c1) =
Z c
c1
[1 H(x)]n 1 dx:
Combining this equation with (11) at the optimum leads to the equilibrium bidding function
b(c) = c+
R c
c [1 H(x)]n 1 dx
[1 H(c)]n 1
12Cf. Riley and Samuelson (1981), McAfee and McMillan (1987a), or Wolfstetter (1995).
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which is equal to the expected second order statistic in the random sample of n cost types
conditional on c being the lowest, i.e. the rst order statistic.
7.2 Minor algebraic manipulations: (8)
Setting expected prots from both entry strategies equal to each other leads to
E
h
L+M1 j (l1 > m1;m1)
i
  E[M1 jm1] = 0:
The following terms of the LHS correspond to the terms in the denition of expected prots; the
following terms on the RHS are the resulting terms in equation (8); terms which are identical
in denitions and (8) are not reproduced.
cZ
c
g2(m2)Z
m2
f(l2;m2)
2
dl2 dm2  [2c  (l1 +m1)] =
2c   lcrit1 +m1
2
cZ
c
g2(m2)Z
m2
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
(B+C)
=
2c   lcrit1 +m1
2
264 cZ
c
cZ
m2
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2  
cZ
c
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
375
=
2c   lcrit1 +m1
2
2641
2
 
cZ
c
cZ
g2(m2)
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2
375 (since f(l;m) = f(m; l))
cZ
c
m2Z
c
f(l2;m2) dl2 dm2  ( c m1) = c m1
2
(since f(l;m) = f(m; l)) (D)
7.3 Proof of Lemma 7, p. 13
Here we briey show standard revenue equivalence for a single-shot procurement auction. We
use the Envelope-theorem approach. In a procurement context, the rms expected prot is
given by
(bi; ci) = R(bi; b i)  Prfwing ci
where R(bi; b i) is the expected payment of the buyer to the rm if it submits bid bi and its
competitors bid according to b i. By denition of the prot function we have
d
dci
=
@
@bi
dbi
dci
+
@
@ci
This holds also at the optimum where maximization of  requires @@bi = 0, thus
d
dci
=
@
@ci
at the optimum
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We can use the denition of the expected prot function to substitute for the RHS and get:
d
dci
=  Prfwing at the optimum
Since we conjecture that the equilibrium bidding function is strictly increasing and it must be
optimal to bid according to the true type in equilibrium we have
d(ci)
dci
=  [1  F (ci)]n 1
where we assume n bidders in the auction. Integrating in the bounds [ci; c] yields
(ci) = (c) +
Z c
ci
[1  F (ci)]n 1dci
where the asterisk denotes the maximum expected prot function. Since the highest-cost type
always loses the auction in equilibrium and is assumed to have no outside option, (c) = 0,
hence
(ci) =
Z c
ci
[1  F (ci)]n 1dci
and with two bidders
(ci) =
Z c
ci
[1  F (ci)]dci
In the sequential auction model in auction M given competition, we simply substitute the
appropriate cdf into the given expression and obtain the claimed result.
7.4 A Numerical Example
In order to illustrate the results of our model, we utilize a bivariate uniform distribution to
explicitly determine equilibrium entry and bidding strategies under the rst-price sealed-bid
auction design with:
f (l2;m2) =
8<:
1
(c c)2 if c  l2  c; c  m2  c
0 otherwise
:
Since bidding behavior depends on the entry indi¤erence curve, we begin with the derivation of
g (m) : Equation (9) implicitly denes g (m) and simplies with our distributional assumption
to the following di¤erential equation:
 g
0 (m)
2
Z c
c
[c  g (m2)] dm2   g
0 (m)
4
+
1
4
  1
2
Z c
c
[c  g (m2)] dm2
+
1

Z c
m
[c  g (m2)] dm2 = 0
with  = (c  c)2 : This equation can be reduced to the following second-order di¤erential equa-
tion
z00 (m)  z (m)
v1
  v2
v1
= 0 (12)
27
where
z (m) =
Z c
m
[c  g (m2)] dm2; (13)
v1 =

z (c)
2
+
1
4

; v2 =

1
4
  z (c)
2

: (14)
The general solution of (12) is
z (m) = A1e
mp
v1 +A2e
 mp
v1   v2;
where A1 and A2 are arbitrary constants of integration. The fact that g (c) = c implies z0 (c) = 0
and z (c) = 0: In consequence, A1 and A2 are determined by the following system of equations:
z (c) = A1e
cp
v1 +A2e
 cp
v1   v2 = 0
z0 (c) =
A1e
cp
v1  A2e
 cp
v1p
v1
= 0;
with solution
A1 =
1
2
v2
e(c=
p
v1)
;A2 =
1
2
v2e
(c=
p
v1):
Therefore, the denite solution of (12) is:
z (m) =
1
2
v2

e
m cp
v1 + e
c mp
v1   2

:
Note that v1 and v2 depend on z (c) : For a given parameter c; z (c) can be numerically derived
by solving the following equation w.r.t. z (c) :
z (c) =
1
2
v2 (z (c))

e
m cp
v1(z(c)) + e
c mp
v1(z(c))   2

: (15)
By construction of (13), g (m) = c+ z0 (m) such that the entry indi¤erence curve is given by
g(m) = c+
1
2
v2
24e m cpv1   e c mpv1p
v1
35 :
For the remainder of this example, let the domain of project costs be given by [c; c]2 = [20; 100]2
implying  = 6400; z (20) = 1475:4373, v1 = 0:365 and v2 = 0:135: For this distribution, the
entry indi¤erence curve is given by
g (m) = 100 + 8:938 
h
e
m 100
48:332   e 100 m48:332
i
:
The cdf of opportunity-cost-augmented completion cost levels of project L is given by
F (x) =
(x  20)2
12; 800
:
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Figure 5: g(m) for (l;m)  U [20; 100]2
Figure 6: Equilibrium bidding function bL ()
Using this result and the numerical function g(m) with proposition 2a leads to the equilibrium
bidding strategy in auction L:
bL () =
8<: 100 for g(m)  l  m2
3
3 302 1;660;000
2 40 12;400 otherwise
:
If both rms dont submit a bid in the rst auction; each of them uses this information to update
its beliefs about its competitors distribution of completion costs resulting in the a posteriori
density fM jSkip (x):
fM jSkip (x) = 0:00604 

e
100 x
48:332   e
x 100
48:332

:
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According to proposition 2b, the bidding function of a rm that submits a bid in the second
auction M is given by
bM (m) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
100 if it is the only bidder
m+
0:5839(m 100)+14:110
24e 100 m48:332  em 10048:332
35
0:292
"
e
100 m
48:332
+e
m 100
48:332
#
 0:5839
otherwise
Figure 7: Equilibrium bidding function bM (m)
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